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THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
IN 1993-1994
MICHAEL M. LOWE
[The Freedom of Information Act] is the Taj Mahal of Unantici-
pated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Ignored.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)2 to allow citizens greater access to government informa-
tion. The statute established an unprecedented public right to
disclosure of information from federal agencies, limited only by
nine exemptions.3 Some observers viewed it as fundamentally
1. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG., Mar.-
Apr. 1982, at 14, 15.
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
3. FOIA exempts from disclosure matters that are:
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B)
are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of
this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a per-
son and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,
(B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudica-
tion, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a'
confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or
any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and,
in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement
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transforming American democracy by finally allowing the public to
hold the government accountable. Since its passage, however,
FOIA has attracted much criticism because of its unanticipated
consequences. Many commentators now observe that FOIA is
neither operating effectively to promote public disclosure nor pro-
moting the interests of federal agencies.'
One unanticipated consequence is the high cost of FOIA. In
1966, estimates placed the cost of FOIA at about $50,000 per
6year. However, the unexpected flood of FOIA requests7 during
authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a
lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a
confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law en-
forcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be
expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected
to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports pre-
pared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regula-
tion or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
4. See, e.g., Elias Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom
of Information Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741 (1975). "[T]he Freedom of Information Act lets the
citizen strip away the secrecy that surrounds the lawmaking process and discover who is
making the law, for what purposes, to affect whom." Id. at 742-43. Clark concluded that
"[t]he amended Act will affect fundamentally the way we govern ourselves." Id. at 768.
5. Even observers such as Judge Patricia M. Wald, who strongly supports the princi-
ples behind a freedom of information statute, acknowledge that "there is probably much
room for improvement in FOIA." Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A
Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY
L.J. 649, 679 (1984).
6. Id. at 660 (citation omitted).
7. A major cause of the large number of FOIA requests is the unexpectedly wide
range of uses for which FOIA is now being employed. Although FOIA's enactors envi-
sioned the statute as a method for the public to gain information about the government,
the most popular use of FOIA has been by businessmen and lawyers as an aid in indus-
try and in court. In fact, the Department of Justice found that only one of every 20
FOIA requestors was a journalist, scholar, or public interest organization. Freedom of
Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1981) [hereinafter Freedom of Information Act
Hearings] (statement of Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Policy, Department of Justice). Four of five FOIA requestors were business executives or
their lawyers. Id. This wide variety of uses of FOIA is possible because Congress did not
require that any specific reason be given to invoke FOIA. Consequently, as long as Con-
gress leaves the statute in its current form, the right of businessmen and lawyers to use
FOIA for any purpose will continue. This Note uses the term "the public's interest in
disclosure" to encompass the different possible uses of FOIA, including requests by busi-
nessmen and lawyers as well as those made by the other members of the public and the
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the years following FOIA's enactment8 has resulted in annual
costs 'of anywhere from $47 million to $250 million.9 Although
agencies may charge requestors for search and duplication costs,"0
the agencies must bear the cost of examining the requested docu-
ments to determine whether any of the material is exempt from
disclosure. As Justice Antonin Scalia and Senator Orrin Hatch
have pointed out, this determination is the most costly part of
FOIA processing because it requires highly trained agency person-
nel to review the requested materials.1 For instance, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) has had to assign two hundred senior
intelligence officers to review FOIA requests to ensure that confi-
dential information is not disclosed. 2 As Justice Scalia has stated,
these high costs entailed by FOIA "might not be defects in the
best of all possible worlds. They are foolish extravagances only
because we do not have an unlimited amount of federal money to
spend, [or] an unlimited number of agency employees to as-
sign .... 13
Because agencies do not have unlimited budgets to absorb the
high costs of FOIA, another unanticipated result of the Act has
been the emergence of long backlogs of FOIA requests at many
federal agencies. The drafters of the 1974 amendments to FOIA
clearly did not foresee such delays in answering requests when
they imposed strict statutory deadlines on agencies.14 Robert
Vaughn recognizes these limits as a flaw in the very structure of
FOIA, because the deadlines are rendered meaningless in practice
press.
8. A 1983 estimate placed the number of annual FOIA requests at about one mil-
lion. Glen 0. Robinson, Access to Government Information: The American Experience, 14
FED. L. REV. 35, 36 (1983) (citation omitted).
9. Wald, supra note 5, at 660 (footnote omitted) (citing a 1981 estimate).
10. FOIA provides for a waiver of these costs if the request is considered primarily
to benefit the general public. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).
11. See Orrin G. Hatch, Balancing Freedom of Information with Confidentiality for
Law Enforcement, 9 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 9 (1983); Scalia, supra note 1, at 16.
12. Freedom of Information Act Hearings. supra note 7, at 579 (statement of CIA
Director William J. Casey).
13. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17-18.
14. Under FOIA, agencies must respond to a request within ten working days. Agen-
cies are allowed an extra ten working days "in unusual circumstances." 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6). Courts have not enforced these deadlines, however. See Robert G. Vaughn.
Administrative Alternatives and the Federal Freedom of Information Act, 45 OHIo ST. LJ.
185, 189 (1984); Andrew Blum, Freedom to Battle for Data: FOJA Still Perplexes Some of
Its Critics, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 12, 1990, at 1, 28.
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by widespread agency backlogs. Requestors often have had to
wait months or even years to receive answers to their FOIA re-
quests. A General Accounting Office study in 1983 found that,
excluding requests for which no records were available, the aver-
age time taken to answer a FOIA request was 191 days at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 270 days at the Office
of Information and Privacy. 6 As of 1990, the FBI's combined
backlog of FOIA and Privacy Act requests amounted to about
eight thousand." Most federal agencies are overwhelmed by the
number of FOIA requests and lack adequate resources to process
them." Even Attorney General Janet Reno has recognized that
the backlogs "appear[] to be a problem of too few resources in
the face of too heavy a workload."'19
However, prospects for agencies to obtain more resources to
meet the demand appear bleak. For instance, in 1989, an FBI
request for forty-three additional staffers to process FOIA requests
was denied by the Office of Management and Budget.2" With the
current emphasis on "reinventing government" and reducing the
government's size, agencies are not likely to receive more resourc-
es for handling FOIA requests. Instead, backlogs likely will con-
tinue at most federal agencies, frustrating FOIA requestors seeking
to assert their statutory right of disclosure and placing a continual
burden on the agencies.
Today, FOIA is not operating as Congress intended. Never-
theless, in the absence of statutory changes, the public's right to
disclosure must continue to be respected to the greatest extent
possible. At the same time, because agencies are having trouble
handling the volume of FOIA requests, new and existing burdens
on the agencies must be minimized so that agencies can use their
resources to process requests most effectively. Thus, when courts
interpret FOIA provisions or the executive establishes new FOIA
15. Vaughn, supra note 14, at 188.
16. Id. at 188 n.24 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMA-
TION ACT OPERATIONS AT SIx DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNITS 1-2 (1983)).
17. Blum, supra note 14, at 29.
18. Of course, indigenous factors such as agency recalcitrance often are present and
can combine with insufficient resources to produce long FOIA backlogs.
19. Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno for Heads of Departments and
Agencies 3 (Oct. 4, 1993) [hereinafter Reno Memo] (on file with author).
20. Blum. supra note 14. at 28.
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guidelines, it is imperative that the interests of the agencies be
recognized along with the public's right to disclosure.,
This Note addresses the important developments under FOIA
in 1993 and early 1994. Part I analyzes the impact of recent deci-
sions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit on pro se litigants' entitlement
to attorney's fees under FOIA. Part II discusses the 1994 Supreme
Court case, Department of Defense v. FLRA,21 which held that
FOIA does not allow federal sector labor unions to receive lists of
employees' names and addresses. Part III considers the Supreme
Court's 1993 opinion in Department of Justice v. Landano,22
which clarified the FBI's burden when it seeks to exempt confi-
dential sources and information from disclosure under FOIA. Part
IV evaluates the Clinton administration's 1993 guidelines for agen-
cy review of FOIA requests. Throughout this survey, this Note
examines whether the recent legal developments properly accom-
modate both the public's disclosure interest and the government's
interest in minimizing the burden imposed by FOIA. Finally, this
Note concludes that the courts and the Clinton administration
achieved only mixed success in 1993 and early 1994 in addressing
these important concerns.
I. THE AWARDING OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PRO SE
LITIGANTS AFTER KAY V. EHRLER
In 1974, Congress amended FOIA to provide for attorney's
fee awards. Under section 552(a)(4)(E), courts "may assess against
the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation
costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which
the complainant has substantially prevailed."' As FOIA claimants
began invoking this section, the courts began considering whether
pro se litigants could receive attorney's fees. These cases involved
two types of pro se litigants--non-attorney and attorney FOIA
requestors. In 1991, the Supreme Court in Kay v. Ehrler resolved
a disagreement among the circuit courts over whether pro se attor-
ney litigants in civil rights actions should be entitled to attorney's
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,24 providing new insight into whether
21. 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994).
22. 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E).
24. 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991).
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either pro se attorney litigants or pro se non-attorney litigants
should receive attorney's fees under FOIA.
A. Background
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Kay, almost all the
courts of appeals had ruled that pro se non-attorney litigants were
not entitled to attorney's fees under section 552(a)(4)(E) of
FOIA.' Only the D.C. Circuit had held that pro se non-attorney
litigants were eligible to receive attorney's fees.26 With respect to
pro se attorney litigants, four 'circuits considered this. issue. The
Sixth and First Circuits held that pro se attorney litigants were not
entitled to attorney's fees under FOIA2 The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, ruled that although pro se non-attorney litigants were ineligi-
ble for attorney's fees under circuit precedent, pro se attorney liti-
gants could receive attorney's fees.' The D.C. Circuit remained
consistent with its earlier holding allowing awards for pro se non-
attorney litigants and ruled that pro se attorney litigants also were
eligible for attorney's fees.29
These circuit splits remained in 1991 when the Supreme Court
decided Kay v. Ehrler. The facts of Kay did not directly involve
FOIA but instead dealt with a pro se attorney litigant seeking at-
torney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.30 Holding that pro se attor-
25. See Kuzma v. IRS, 821 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1987); Merrell v. Block, 809 F.2d
639, 642 (9th Cir. 1987); Clarkson v. IRS, 811 F.2d 1396, 1397 n.1 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1031 (1987); DeBold v. Stimson, 735 F.2d 1037, 1041-43 (7th Cir. 1984);
Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 67-68 (6th Cir. 1983); Cunningham v. FBI, 664
F.2d 383, 384-87 (3d Cir. 1981); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1088-89
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Crooker v. Department of Justice, 632
F.2d 916, 920-21 (1st Cir. 1980); Burke v. Department of Justice. 559 F.2d 1182, 1182
(10th Cir. 1977).
26. See Cox v. Department of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
27. See Aronson v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 866 F.2d 1, 4-6 (1st Cir.
1989); Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908
(1984).
28. See Cazalas v. Department of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1055-57 (5th Cir. 1983).
29. See Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
30. Although Kay involved the fee-shifting provision under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988),
its interpretation of that provision can be applied to the fee-shifting provision under
FOIA. Section 1988(b) provides that courts "may allow the prevailing party . . . a rea-
sonable attorney's fee" in civil rights litigation. Because the Court in Kay interpreted the
plain meaning of general language that appears in both § 1988 and § 552(a)(4)(E), the
Court would not likely adopt a different interpretation of the word "attorney" under
FOIA.
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ney litigants are not entitled to attorney's fees under section 1988,
the Court in Kay interpreted the term "attorney" as requiring an
attorney-client relationship. Two years later, in Benavides v. Bu-
reau of Prisons,3' the D.C. Circuit, as a result of Kay, reversed
itself regarding the awarding of attorney's fees to pro se non-attor-
ney litigants under FOIA?2 In Benavides, the petitioner, a pro se
non-attorney, had prevailed in his suit against the Bureau of Pris-
ons for disclosure of documents and had then sought attorney's
fees under section 552(a)(4)(E). After the district court refused
Benavides's request for attorney's fees, he appealed. By holding
that pro se non-attorney litigants are ineligible for attorney's fees
under FOIA, the D.C. Circuit joined the other circuits' interpreta-
tion of section 552(a)(4)(E).
B. Kay's Application to Pro Se Litigants' Requests for Attorney's
Fees Under FOIA
The D.C. Circuit recognized in Benavides that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Kay supports the interpretation that pro se non-
attorney litigants should not be entitled to attorney's fees under
section 552(a)(4)(E). Moreover, although the holding in Benavides
is limited to pro se non-attorney litigants, the application of the
Court's analysis in Kay demonstrates that pro se attorney litigants
likewise should be denied attorney's fees under FOIA. As a result,
after Kay, courts should deny attorney's fees to pro se attorney
and non-attorney litigants alike under FOIA.
Section 552(a)(4)(E) does not specifically refer to pro se liti-
gants but states only that courts have discretion to award "reason-
able attorney fees" when a requestor has "substantially prevailed"
in a case.33 In Kay, the Court discussed the meaning of the word
"attorney." The Court acknowledged that the petitioner in Kay
was an "attorney" and stated that "[t]he Circuits are in agree-
ment ... on the proposition that a pro se litigant who is not a
lawyer is not entitled to attorney's fees," adding that it was "satis-
fied that [these cases] were correctly decided."' As the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Benavides asserted, "the opinion [in Kay] gives a clear
indication that, absent congressional intent to the contrary, the
31. 993 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 559 (1993).
32. Id. at 259.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E).
34. Kay v. Ehrler. 499 U.S. 432. 435 (1991).
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Supreme Court believes that the word 'attorney,' when used in the
context of a fee-shifting statute, does not encompass a lay-person
proceeding on his own behalf."35 As a result, pro se non-attorney
litigants under FOIA are not entitled to attorney's fees, because
the language of the fee-shifting provision as interpreted by the
Court in Kay dictates that attorney's fees accrue only if an attor-
ney is present.36
The rationale of Kay also demonstrates that pro se attorney
litigants are not covered by FOIA's fee-shifting provision. The
Court stated that "the word 'attorney' assumes an agency relation-
ship, and it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-
client relationship as the predicate for an award under § 1988.237
In supporting this assumption, the Court referred to several dic-
tionary definitions of the word "attorney" that show that it de-
notes an agency relationship.38 Because, as stressed in Kay, the
phrase "attorney's fees" requires the presence of an agency rela-
tionship between a client and an attorney, pro se attorney litigants
should not come within the ambit of section 552(a)(4)(E).
The legislative purpose behind section 552(a)(4)(E) also indi-
cates that pro se litigants should not be entitled to receive attor-
35. Benavides, 993 F.2d at 259.
36. The Seventh Circuit, in DeBold v. Stimson, 735 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984), also
came to this conclusion:
The term "attorney fees" contemplates that the services of an attorney be uti-
lized. The simple language of the statute controls. Attorney means attorney. We
have no doubt that Blue Cross/Blue Shield would balk at a request for doctor
fees from a person who removed his own appendix, or more realistically, a
request for dental fees from someone who extracted his own tooth. No one
would be entitled to reimbursement for therapist fees for attempts at self-im-
provement or for finding solutions to one's own problems. . . .Myriad exam-
ples leap to mind that need not be repeated here.
Id. at 1042 (citations omitted).
The DeBold court reiterated its prior finding in Langer Roofing & Sheet Metal,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor. 524 F.2d 1337, 1339 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975), that it had
expressly disavowed non-liberal, unreasonable interpretation of words and ex-
pressly rejected the Humpty Dumpty theory of language.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to'mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many different things."
"The question is" said Humpty Dumpty. "which is to be master-that's
all."
Debold, 735 F.2d at 1042 n.3 (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
190 (Washington Square Press 1951) (1871)).
37. Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-36 (footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 436 n.6.
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ney's fees. Because the legislative history of the 1974 amendments
does not specifically refer to pro se litigants,39 there has been
sharp disagreement among the circuits and other courts over
whether Congress's purpose in enacting section 552(a)(4)(E) sup-
ports the awarding of attorney's fees to pro se litigants. Some
courts, arguing that pro se attorney litigants should be eligible for
section 552(a)(4)(E) attorney's fees, have asserted that deterrence
and enforcement were crucial goals of the 1974 amendments and
that the attorney's fees provision was intended in part to increase
the compliance of government agencies.40 According to this inter-
pretation, the awarding of attorney's fees to pro se litigants fur-
thers the legislative purpose of FOIA's fee-shifting provision, be-
cause the deterrent effect of such awards encourages government
compliance regardless of whether an attorney is actually involved
in the suit.
The. majority of the circuits, however, have countered that
agency compliance was not the significant legislative purpose be-
hind the enactment of FOIA's fee-shifting provision4" and that
instead "the fundamental purpose of section 552(a)(4)(E) [was] to
facilitate citizen access to the courts to vindicate their statutory
rights."42 The First Circuit, in Aronson v. Department of Housing
39. See Janet A. Bradley, Note, Pro Se Complainants and the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act: Neglected, Not Rejected, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 15, 16, 28 (1985); Lisa A. Mednick,
Note, Awarding Fees to the Self-Represented Attorney Under the Freedom of Information
Act, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291, 292-96 (1984-1985); Cathy Seibel, Note, Fee Awards
for Pro Se Attorney and Nonattorney Plaintiffs Under the Freedom of Information Act, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 374, 383 (1983).
40. See Cazalas v. Department of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating
that "the provision serves a deterrent and, to a lesser extent, a punitive purpose");
Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (describing how successful
FOIA litigants help to bring "the government into compliance with the law"); McReady
v. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs. 618 A.2d 609, 621 (D.C. 1992)
(Ferren, J., dissenting) (stressing the importance of the enforcement purpose of FOIA's
attorney's fee provision). The dissenting opinion in McReady also referred to the purpos-
es of the 1974 amendments, as indicated in the accompanying Senate Report:
[T]o facilitate freer and more expeditious public access to government informa-
tion, to encourage more faithful compliance with the terms and objectives of
the FOIA, to strengthen the citizen's remedy against agencies and officials who
violate the Act, and to provide for closer congressional oversight of agency
performance under the Act.
Id. at 621 n.12 (quoting S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974)).
41. See, e.g., Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257, 259-60 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 559 (1993).
42. Id. at 260 (quoting Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704,
715 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
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and Urban Development, declared that "the purpose of the fee
section of the Act was to eliminate the obstacle of attorney fees
so that all litigants would have access to the courts to pursue their
rights under FOIA."'  Several courts pointed to the Senate Re-
port accompanying the 1974 amendments, which stated that "[t]oo
often the barriers presented by court costs and attorneys' fees are
insumountable [sic] for the average person requesting informa-
tion., 45 Thus, according to these courts, the dominant purpose of
FOIA's fee-shifting provision was to increase citizens' access to the
courts rather than to provide deterrence or to help enforce gov-
ernment compliance with FOIA.46
The Court's opinion in Kay implicitly endorsed the view that
improving access to the courts is the most important legislative
purpose behind FOIA's fee-shifting provision. In a footnote, the
Kay Court discussed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Falcone v. IRS.
In Falcone, the Court of Appeals declined to award attorney's
fees to a pro se attorney in a successful action under [FOIA].
The Court of Appeals reasoned that attorney's fees in FOIA
actions were inappropriate because the award was intended "to
relieve plaintiffs with legitimate claims of the burden of legal
costs" and "to encourage potential claimants to seek legal advice
before commencing litigation."'47
By referring to Falcone's interpretation of the legislative purpose
of FOIA's fee-shifting provision without disapproval and identify-
ing it as essentially the same rationale as that underlying the fee-
43. 866 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 5.
45. Sampson, 559 F.2d at 711 (quoting S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1974)) (alteration in original).
46. See Benavides, 993 F.2d. at 260 ("To the extent that the fee-shifting provision in
FOIA helps deter violations of the law, that result is only a serendipitous by-product of
encouraging aggrieved individuals to obtain an attorney."); Aronson, 866 F.2d at 5 ("[W]e
disagree with the Fifth Circuit that the purpose of the fee provision of FOIA is to deter
and punish the government for unnecessarily withholding information."); Cunningham v.
FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Congress certainly gave no evidence of seeking
to do more than to lift those barriers, as it might have by, for example, authorizing
punitive damages or some other noncompensatory award."); Crooker v. Department of
Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 920-21 (1st Cir. 1980) ("The amendment was 'not enacted to pro-
vide a reward for any litigant who successfully force[d] the government to disclose in-
formation it wish[ed] to withhold,' or to penalize government agencies who were forced
to disclose.") (quoting Sampson, 559 F.2d at 711).
47. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 434 n.4 (1991) (quoting Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d
646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted), cert. denied. 466 U.S. 908 (1984)).
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.shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Kay Court implicitly en-
dorsed the purpose stated in Falcone as the primary legislative
purpose behind section 552(a)(4)(E).48
Pro se attorney litigants, on the other hand, might argue that
the purpose behind section 552(a)(4)(E) would still be served if
they were awarded attorney's fees, because they are acting as
counsel by representing themselves in court. However, the Court
in Kay asserted that such representation by attorneys on their own
behalf does not further the purpose stated in Falcone of
"encourag[ing] potential claimants to seek legal advice before com-
mencing litigation. '49 The Court explained that
[e]ven a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvan-
tage in contested litigation. Ethical considerations may make it
inappropriate for him to appear as a witness. He is deprived of
the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory
of the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the
evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal ar-
guments, and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion,
dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen developments
in the courtroom. The adage that "a lawyer who represents him-
self has a fool for a client" is the product of years of experience
by seasoned litigators.50
Because an attorney representing himself gives up the benefits of
representation by another attorney, encouraging pro se attorney
litigation does not serve the purpose of improving adequate access
to the courts. Consequently, the Court's opinion in Kay, as applied
to the analysis of both the text and the legislative purpose of
section 552(a)(4)(E), supports the position that pro se attorney and
non-attorney litigants should not be eligible for attorney's fees un-
der FOIA's fee-shifting provision.
Not only is the denial of attorney's fees to pro se attorney
and non-attorney litigants consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion in Kay, but it also comports with the need to satisfy the
public's right to disclosure while alleviating the burden on agen-
48. See also Benavides, 993 F.2d at 260 ("In discussing Falcone, the Supreme Court
in Kay says absolutely nothing to suggest that the rationale given to support the holding
in Falcone was wanting or that the considerations affecting the disposition of fee claims
under FOIA and section 1988 should be viewed differently.").
49. Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647.
50. Kay, 499 U.S. at 437-38 (footnote omitted).
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cies. Arguably, allowing the award of attorney's fees to pro se liti-
gants might in certain circumstances further the interest of disclo-
sure under FOIA. The First Circuit in Crooker v. Department of
Justice acknowledged that "[w]e are not unmindful that pro se
litigation does sometimes advance the policy aims of FOIA.)5 1
The Third Circuit in Cunningham v. FBI added that "providing
attorney fees to pro se litigants may serve some of these interests
by increasing enforcement of legitimate rights" under FOIA. 2
For instance, the awarding of attorney's fees to successful pro se
litigants might cause previously recalcitrant agencies to be more
compliant in future cases and thereby further the interest in disclo-
sure. In the aggregate, however, the public's interest in disclosure
would be furthered not by allowing attorney's fees to be awarded
to pro se litigants but instead by encouraging claimants to obtain
independent counsel. As the Court in Kay asserted, claims are
promoted much more effectively when claimants are assisted by
objective and detached independent counsel.53
Disallowing attorney's fees for pro se litigants also reduces the
burdens on government agencies. Federal agencies, already short
on resources due to the large number of FOIA requests, must not
be additionally burdened by the frivolous litigation that could
result from encouraging pro se litigation. As the Fifth Circuit in
Barrett v. Bureau of Customs 4 asserted,
Persons contemplating legal action should be encouraged to con-
sult with attorneys. Litigation may not be necessary. Frustrations
and misunderstandings or failures of understanding by the intend-
ed complainant may be quickly soothed and resolved by counsel.
We do not believe it naive to expect that the result of the inter-
vention of counsel will be compliance with the law by the agency
involved, a furnishing of the information sought, and an avoid-
ance of unnecessary litigation.
By establishing that pro se litigants are ineligible for attorney's
fees, the courts encourage FOIA litigants to obtain independent /
51. 632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980).
52. 664 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1981).
53. Kay, 499 U.S. at 437; see also McNeil v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1980, 1984
n.10 (1993) (stating that the Kay Court "recognized a systemic interest in having a party
represented by independent counsel even when the party is a lawyer").
54. 651 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
55. Id. at 1089-90.
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counsel and thereby help reduce the burden of litigation on gov-
ernment agencies.
II. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE V. FLRA: THE DISCLOSURE OF
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' NAMES AND ADDRESSES UNDER
THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS STATUTE AND FOIA
During the years following the enactment of the Federal Ser-
vice Labor-Management Relations Statute (FLRS)57 in 1978, a
consensus among the circuit courts emerged that federal sector
labor unions could gain access to employee lists from federal em-
ployers. In 1989, however, the U.S. Supreme Court decided De-
partment of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
58Press, causing a majority of circuits to reverse their precedents
and deny federal unions access to personnel data. This circuit split
persisted until 1994, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Depart-
ment of Defense v. FLRA that FOIA does not allow federal sector
labor unions access to employee lists. 9
A. Background
In 1978, Congress adopted the FLRS to guarantee the col-
lective bargaining rights of federal employees in the civil service.
Congress proclaimed that
the statutory protection of the right of employees to organize,
bargain collectively, and participate through labor organizations
of their own choosing in decisions which affect them (A) safe-
guards the public interest, (B) contributes to the effective con-
duct of public business, and (C) facilitates and encourages the
56. Of course, in some circumstances, this argument may be merely theoretical. In
real life, many pro se litigants are unaware before they go to court whether they are
entitled to attorney's fees as pro se litigants under FOIA. Thus, whether or not the law
makes them eligible for attorney's fees is unlikely to encourage them to seek counsel
before beginning litigation. Journalists, attorneys, and certain other requestors may, on
the other hand, be apprised of the current legal situation and thus may be encouraged to
seek counsel if, suing on their own behalf, they would not be entitled to attorney's fees
under FOIA.
57. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988).
58. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
59. 114 S. Ct. 1006, 1009 (1994).
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amicable settlements of disputes between employees and their
employers involving conditions of employment. 60
To facilitate such collective bargaining, the FLRS outlines the
responsibilities of both federal employee ,unions and federal em-
ployers. Labor organizations in the federal sector must represent
all employees of a particular federal employer, including those
employees who do not belong to the union.6' Federal employers,
for their part, must "furnish to the exclusive representative in-
volved, or its authorized representative, upon request and, to the
extent not prohibited by law, data ... which is reasonably avail-
able and necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding,
and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargain-
ing. ,,96
After the enactment of the FLRS, labor organizations began
to seek lists of employees' names and addresses as part of their
effort to represent federal employees. The federal unions argued
that such information was "reasonably available and necessary" for
purposes of collective bargaining and thus must be made available
under the FLRS. Certain federal employers, however, refused to
provide the requested information, and the respective unions sub-
sequently filed unfair labor practice charges with the Federal La-
bor Relations Authority (FLRA). The FLRA consistently took the
position that employees' names and addresses were "reasonably
available and necessary" for collective bargaining.63 In Farmers
Home Administration Finance Office v. American Federation of
Government Employees, the FLRA reasoned that because section
7114(a)(1) of the FLRS requires a federal labor union to represent
all members of a unit regardless of whether they belong to the
union, "it is obvious that a union must be able to identify and
communicate with [all its] bargaining unit members if it is to ade-
quately represent them."' 4 Thus, according to the FLRA, disclo-
sure of employees' names and addresses is necessary for the col-
lective bargaining process because it "enable[s] the Union to com-
60. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1).
61. Id. § 7114(a)(1).
62. Id. § 7114(b)(4)(B).
63. See, e.g., Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard v. International
Fed'n of Professional & Technical Eng'rs Local 4, 37 F.L.R.A. 515 (1990); Farmers
Home Admin. Fin. Office v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 3354, 23
F.L.R.A. 788 (1986).
64. Farmers Home, 23 F.L.R.A. at 796.
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municate effectively and efficiently, through direct mailings to
individual employees." 65
The circuit courts of appeals "uniformly upheld, 66 the
FLRA's ruling that disclosure of employees' names and addresses
is "reasonably available and necessary" for collective bargaining
within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4)(B).67 Yet, under the
terms of the FLRS, even though such information may be "reason-
able and necessary,"' it can be disclosed only "to the extent not
prohibited by law., 69 Such disclosure, in fact, generally is prohib-
ited by the Privacy Act, which forbids the release of personnel
information without an employee's consent.70 The Privacy Act,
however, contains two exceptions: information may be disclosed if
it would be "required under section 552 of [FOIA or] for a rou-
tine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of [section 552a].' If
disclosure of employees' names and addresses is required under
FOIA, then the Privacy Act does not apply and such disclosure is
not prohibited by law. FOIA, in turn, generally mandates disclo-
sure, except when one of its exemptions applies. Exemption 6 of
FOIA covers information in "personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 72 Thus, if Exemption 6
applies, disclosure of information is not required under FOIA.
Consequently, FOIA would not serve as an exception to the Priva-
cy Act, and the release of such information would be prohibited
by both the Privacy Act and the FLRS. Accordingly, in the cases
before the circuits, the determination of whether unions are enti-
65. Id.
66. FLRA v. Department of Defense, 975 F.2d 1105, 1108 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
Department of Defense v. FLRA, 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994).
67. Id. at 1101 (quoting Farmers Home, 23 F.L.R.A. at 796).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(B).
69. Id. § 7114(b)(4).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988). This provision states in pertinent part: "No agency shall
disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communi-
cation to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or
with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains .... " Id.
§ 552a(b)(2).
71. Id. § 552a(b)(2)-(b)(3). This Note does not analyze the routine use exception
because it does not pertain to FOIA. In addition, the Supreme Court in Department of
Defense did not consider this exception. See Department of Defense v. FLRA, 114 S. Ct.
1006. 1012 n.5 (1994).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
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tied to the disclosure of employees' names and addresses centered
on the interpretation of Exemption 6 of FOIA.
In the initial round of cases before 1989, the circuit courts
evaluated whether Exemption 6 applied so as to prevent labor
organizations from obtaining employee lists. In Department of the
Air Force v. Rose, the Supreme Court held that the determination
of whether a certain disclosure constitutes such an invasion of pri-
vacy involves a balancing of the harm to the individual whose
privacy is affected against the public interest served if disclosure is
allowed.73 Prior to 1989, courts held that the public interest in-
volved in the disclosure of employees' names and addresses out-
weighed the relevant privacy interests.74 The courts all found that
employees had at least some privacy interest in keeping their
names and addresses undisclosed.75 The courts, however, found
the furtherance of collective bargaining through such disclosure to
be a particularly weighty public interest.76 After all, Congress it-
self stated in the FLRS that "the statutory protection of the right
of employees to organize, bargain collectively, and participate
through labor organizations of their own choosing ... safeguards
the public interest."77
Because these courts found that the public intekest served by
disclosure of employees' names and addresses outweighed the
privacy interests affected by such disclosure, they held that the
release of this data to the unions did not constitute an "invasion
73. 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
74. See Department of the Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir.) (upholding
FLRA's disclosure order and characterizing the invasion of privacy as "minimal"), cert.
dismissed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988); Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base v.
FLRA, 838 F.2d 229, 232-33 (7th Cir.) (describing the privacy interest as slight), cert.
dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); Department of Agric. v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139. 1143-44
(8th Cir. 1988) (deferring to the agency's judgment), vacated and remanded, 488 U.S.
1025 (1989); Department of Health and Human Servs., Social Sec. Admin. v. FLRA, 833
F.2d 1129, 1135 (4th Cir. 1987) (deferring to the Authority's ruling), cert. dismissed, 488
U.S. 880 (1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554,
556-57 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that the privacy interest was not compelling).
75. Circuits found the privacy interests to be everything from "modest," "minimal,"
and "not particularly compelling" to "strong." FLRA v. Department of the Treasury, 884
F.2d 1446, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing numerous cases as
examples of these characterizations), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990).
76. See Department of the Navy, 840 F.2d at 1135-37; Department of Agric., 836 F.2d
at 1142-44, Department of Health and Human Servs., 833 F.2d at 1134-36; American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees. 786 F.2d at 556-57.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1)(A).
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of personal privacy ' 78 within the meaning of Exemption 6 of
FOIA. As a result, the circuit courts agreed that FOIA required
the release of employee data to the unions, thereby serving as a
valid exception to the Privacy Act, so that disclosure of the names
and addresses was not prohibited by law within the meaning of
the FLRS.79
B. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press and the Resulting Split Among the Circuits over
the Disclosure of Employee Lists
After the initial round of FLRS cases, a consensus among the
circuits had emerged that the disclosure of emplQyees' names and
addresses to the labor organizations must be permitted under the
FLRS. 0 Then, in 1989, the Supreme Court decided Department
of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press."' In
Reporters Committee, the Court addressed how courts should bal-
ance the public and private interests in determining whether dis-
closure constitutes an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"
under Exemption 7(C) of FOIAY The Court found that the only
public interest to be recognized in such balancing is that of
"open[ing] agency action to the light of public scrutiny" and help-
ing citizens to be "informed about 'what their government is up
to.' "8 3 The Court held that any public interest involved in the
disclosure of "rap sheets" fell "outside the ambit of the public
interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve," because it did not
further the public purpose of opening up agencies to public scruti-
ny.84
After Reporters Committee, a split among the circuits devel-
oped in cases involving the disclosure of employees' names and
addresses to federal sector labor organizations. A majority of the
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
79. Department of the Navy, 840 F.2d at 1137; Department of Agric., 836 F.2d at
1144; Department of Health & Human Servs., 833 F.2d at 1134; American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees. 786 F.2d at 556.
80. See FLRA v. Department of Defense, 975 F.2d 1105, 1111 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
Department of Defense v. FLRA, 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994).
81. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
83. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772-73 (quoting Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)).
84. Id. at 775.
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circuits held that the public interest involved in collective bargain-
ing could no longer be recognized as a relevant public interest for
purposes of interest balancing under Exemption 6 of FOIA'
Because the privacy interests affected by disclosure of personnel
data outweighed a now unrecognized public interest, disclosure
constituted an invasion of privacy prohibited under FOIA. A mi-
nority of the circuits, on the other hand, insisted that Reporters
Committee was inapplicable to the FLRS cases and that disclosure
of employees' names and addresses should continue to be al-
lowed.86
According to the minority circuits, Reporters Committee was
not relevant to the analysis of Exemption 6 in FLRS cases. The
Fifth Circuit, for instance, in FLRA v. Department of Defense, held
that Reporters Committee was inapplicable because it involved
Exemption 7(C) of FOIA whereas the FLRS cases implicated
Exemption 6.8 The court stated that "[w]hile the language in
these two exemptions is somewhat similar, the Supreme Court
pointed out that there are significant enough differences between
them that Exemption 7(C) should be applied more broadly than
Exemption 6." For instance, Exemption 6 states that an invasion
of privacy must be "clearly unwarranted," 9 but under Exemption
7(C) the invasion of privacy need only be "unwarranted."'  In
addition, "while Exemption 6 applies to disclosures which 'would
constitute' an invasion of privacy, Exemption 7(C) pertains to
85. See FLRA v. Department of Defense, 984 F.2d 370, 374-75 (10th Cir. 1993);
FLRA v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d 503, 511-13 (2d Cir. 1992); Depart-
ment of the Navy v. FLRA, 975 F.2d 348, 355 (7th Cir. 1992); FLRA v. Department of
Defense, 977 F.2d 545, 547-48 (11th Cir. 1992); FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 963
F.2d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 1992); FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 941 F.2d 49, 56-57 (1st
Cir. 1991); FLRA v. Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1451-53 (D.C. Cir.
1989). cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990).
86. See FLRA v. Department of Defense, 975 F.2d 1105, 1113-16 (5th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994); FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 756-58
(3d Cir. 1992); FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 958 F.2d 1490, 1497 (9th Cir. 1992).
87. Department of Defense, 975 F.2d at 1113. Exemption 7(C) of FOIA exempts from
disclosure "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (emphasis added). Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure "personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy." Id. § 552(b)(6) (emphasis added).
88. Department of Defense, 975 F.2d at 1113.
89. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)) (alteration in original).
90. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c)).
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disclosures which 'could reasonably be expected to constitute' such
an invasion.""1 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that if
Exemption 7(C) was intended to be a broader standard, any rules
that correspond to such a standard and restrict the type of public
interest that may be balanced against private interests should not
as a matter of course also be used with the narrower Exemption
6.92 Because the Fifth Circuit found Reporters Committee's
statement that the only relevant public interest is that of opening
agencies to public scrutiny inapplicable to Exemption 6, the public
interest served by collective bargaining would continue to be
weighed against private interests under Exemption 6 in the FLRS
cases.
The minority circuits also claimed that Reporters Committee
did not apply to the employee disclosure cases because these cases
arose under the FLRS rather than under FOIA. 93 For instance, in
Department of Defense, the Fifth Circuit stated that although Re-
porters Committee specifies the relevant public interest to be
weighed in evaluating disclosure requests made through FOIA,
when disclosure requests originate from another statute, such as
the FLRS, other public interests also must be considered.94 Ac-
cording to the court, "Reporters[] Committee has absolutely noth-
ing to say about the FLRS, or the situation that arises when dis-
closure is initially required by some other statute other than the
FOIA, and the FOIA is employed only secondarily."'95 The court
insisted that
[w]hen, as here, disclosure is sought through the FOIA only
because the FOIA has been incorporated into another statute as
a mechanism for disclosure of information, it is entirely proper
and necessary-if all of Congress' aims are to be achieved-to
weigh into the balance the interests recognized by the statute
which generates the request for information.96
According to this minority view, the public interest in collective
bargaining still needed to be weighed in determining under Ex-
91. Id, (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C).
92. Id.
93. See id; FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747. 758 (3d Cir. 1992);
FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 958 F.2d 1490, 1496 (9th Cir. 1992).
94. Department of Defense, 975 F.2d at 1115.
95. Id. at 1113.
96. Id. at 1115.
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emption 6 whether personnel data could be disclosed to federal
sector labor organizations.
The minority circuits also argued that common sense dictated
that federal employees' names and addresses should be disclosed
to the unions. The Fifth Circuit, for instance, found it absurd that,
even though every circuit that had previously considered the ques-
tion had held that the public interest in collective bargaining out-
weighed the private interests affected by disclosure, a completely
new position should be adopted after Reporters Committee.97 The
court asserted that "[a]s with the language of the statutes, what-
ever else Reporters[] Committee may have done, it certainly did
not alter the Congressional intent embodied in these statutes.
'
,
98
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit, concurring in
Department of the Treasury, also noted that "[p]erhaps the most
persuasive indication that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
anticipated the outcome in this case is that the balance between
the public interest in disclosure and the individual interests in
privacy, when viewed unfiltered by the lens of Reporters Commit-
tee, overwhelmingly favors disclosure."9 9 In sum, the minority cir-
cuits argued that the disclosure of employees' names and addresses
under the FLRS should continue despite the holding of Reporters
Committee.
The majority of the circuits, however, criticized this approach,
arguing that Reporters Committee changed the analysis of Exemp-
tion 6 so that disclosure of personnel data should no longer be
permitted under the FLRS. These circuits first argued that the
analysis of Reporters Committee extends to Exemption 6, even
though the case involved Exemption 7(C). As the D.C. Circuit
stated,
Although the context in Reporters Committee was the special
privacy exemption for law enforcement records, exemption 7(C),
we see no reason why the character of the disclosure interest
should be different under exemption 6. While exemption 6 pre-
97. Id. at 1114.
98. Id.; see also FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 958 F.2d 1490, 1496 ("We doubt
that Congress intended that its statement of the public interest in section 7101(a)(1) be
ignored when examining the public interest element incorporated into section 7114(b)(4)
through FOIA. Nor does Reporters Committee compel such a result.").
99. FLRA v. Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990).
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cludes only "a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"
(emphasis added), that difference between it and exemption 7(C)
goes only to the weight of the privacy interest needed to out-
weigh disclosure."°
In other words, even though the two exemptions differ in the
weight of the privacy interests needed to prevent disclosure, the
court did not think that standards of what may serve as a public
interest also should be different depending on whether a case
involved Exemption 7(C) or Exemption 6. Moreover, as the Sev-
enth Circuit recognized, Reporters Committee's extensive reliance
on an Exemption 6 case, Department of the Air Force v. Rose,t 1
further demonstrated the interchangeability of Exemption 6 and
Exemption 7(C) analyses."° Thus, the majority circuits argued
that the Court's characterization of the public interest in Exemp-
tion 7(C) balancing as "opening agencies to public scrutiny"'0 3
also should be determinative in Exemption 6 cases involving the
FLRS.
The majority circuits also disagreed with the minority circuits'
contention that cases under the FLRS and FOIA should be treat-
ed differently depending on whether they arise under the FLRS or
directly through FOIA. These courts showed that such an interpre-
tation departs from the plain language of the FLRS. Neither the
FLRS nor the Privacy Act calls for the introduction of a different
public interest from that allowed under conventional FOIA juris-
prudence. The dissenting opinion in the Third Circuit case Depart-
ment of the Navy explained,
[S]ection [7114(b)(4) of the FLRS] requires employers to provide
necessary information to federal sector union representatives only
"to the extent not prohibited by law." Thus, Congress recognized
the possible limitations of other statutory and decisional law.
Nothing in the text of this section lessens the full thrust of such
prohibiting laws; no reference is made to the independent public
interest advanced by the Labor Statute. The majority interprets
this statute to modify the FOIA itself by relying on the federal
sector labor statute's own general objectives. Such an imaginative
100. Id. at 1451-52 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)).
101. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
102. See Department of the Navy v. FLRA, 975 F.2d 348, 353 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992).
103. Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 772-73 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 372).
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interpretation finds no support in the text of the statute; ,"to the
extent not prohibited by law" notably lacks any qualification or
modification.1"
Because the FLRS directly picks up the Privacy Act, which in turn
directly implicates FOIA, there is no room within the statutes to
include an additional public interest just because the disclosure
request was initiated under the FLRS. As the D.C. Circuit stated,
"[w]e do not believe we are entitled to engage in the sort of imag-
inative reconstruction that would be necessary to introduce col-
lective bargaining values into the balancing process."1 5
As a result, the majority circuits insisted that the sole public
interest to be considered in the FLRS cases was increasing the
"public understanding of the operations or activities of the govern-
ment,"1 6 thus excluding consideration of any public interest in
furthering the process of collective bargaining from Exemption 6
balancing. Furthermore, they held that this interest in "opening
agencies to public scrutiny" was not served by disclosing the
names and addresses of employees to federal unions. 7 Conse-
104. FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 769 (3d Cir. 1992) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting). In her concurrence in Department of the Treasury, Judge Ginsburg also stated
that
the logic of the court's opinion [the majority circuits' rationale] is irre-
proachable. The broad cross-reference in 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)--"to the extent
not prohibited by law"-picks up the Privacy Act unmodified; that Act, in turn,
shelters personal records absent the consent of the person to whom the record
pertains, unless disclosure would be required under the Freedom of Information
Act.
Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1457 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
105. Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d. at 1453.
106. Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 775 (1989) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)).
107. See, e.g., FLRA v. Department of Defense, 984 F.2d 370, 375 (10th Cir. 1993)
(stating that "disclosure of federal employees' home addresses has nothing to do with
public scrutiny of government activities"); Department of the Navy v. FLRA, 975 F.2d
348, 355 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The release of the names and home addresses of federal em-
ployees will not serve th[e] purpose [of letting the citizenry know what its government is
up to].").
The FLRA in these cases tried to argue that disclosure of employees' names and
addresses did serve the purpose of letting citizens know what their government was doing
under a "derivative use theory," whereby disclosure is said to contribute to a second-
stage benefit advancing the public interest. For instance, there is "the potential that addi-
tional, publicly valuable information may be generated by further investigative efforts that
disclosure of the [employees' names and addresses] will make possible." Department of
State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 550 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). The D.C. Circuit suggested a hypothetical situation in which "the release
of the employees' home addresses would ...make the work of an investigative reporter
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quently, the majority circuits concluded that the privacy interests
affected by the disclosure of employees' names and addresses
necessarily outweighed the "nonexistent" public interest t"8 and
that therefore such disclosure would constitute a "clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy" under Exemption 6 of FOIA.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in Department of Defense v.
FLRA
In Department of Defense v. FLRA,"9 the Supreme Court
agreed with the majority circuits' approach and held that federal
sector labor unions may not receive access to employee lists under
the FLRS."11 The Court held that for the purpose of FOIA anal-
ysis, it did not matter that Reporters Committee involved Exemp-
tion 7(C) and the FLRS cases involved Exemption 6, stating,
[T]he fact that Reporters Committee dealt with a different FOIA
exemption than the one we focus on today is of little import.
Exemptions 7(C) and 6 differ in the magnitude of the public
interest that is required to override the respective privacy inter-
ests protected by the exemptions .... [H]owever, the dispositive
issue here is the identification of the relevant public interest to
be weighed in the balance, not the magnitude of that interest."'
Because the principles of Reporters Committee were thereby
applicable to the FLRS cases, the Supreme Court asserted that
these standards must be followed. Accordingly, the "only relevant
'public interest in disclosure' to be weighed in [Exemption 6 bal-
ancing] is the extent to which disclosure would serve the 'core
purpose of the FOIA,' which is 'contribut[ing] significantly to
public understanding of the operations or activities of the govern-
attempting to ferret out 'what the government is up to' easier." Department of the Navy,
975 F.2d at 355 n.3 (quoting Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1452). To find that
disclosure fulfills the public purpose of opening agency activity to public scrutiny, howev-
er, requires quite a stretch. As the Second Circuit recognized, "[c]ompelling disclosure of
personal information, that has no relationship to an agency's activities, on so attenuated a
basis would inevitably result in the disclosure of virtually all personal information, there-
by effectively eviscerating the protections of privacy provided by Exemption 6." FLRA v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d 503, 512 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Department of
the Navy, 975 F.2d at 355 n.3 ("To find a public interest in disclosure on so attenuated a
basis would dismantle the privacy protections Congress erected through Exemption 6.").
108. See Department of Defense. 984 F.2d at 375.
109. 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994).
110. Id. at 1009 (1994).
111. 1d. at 1013 n.6.
1304 [Vol. 43:1282
FOIA 1993-1994
ment.' ,,112 Although the minority circuits argued that other policy
considerations, such as the interest in collective bargaining, also
should be included as part of FOIA analysis in FLRS cases, the
Court "decline[d] to accept [this] ambitious invitation to rewrite
the statutes before [it] and to disregard the FOIA principles reaf-
firmed in Reporters Committee.""' The Court ruled that, as the
majority circuits had previously argued, neither the FLRS nor the
Privacy Act nor FOIA creates such a special standard for federal
sector labor unions requesting employee lists."4 As a result, the
Court stated that "the fact that respondents are seeking to vin-
dicate the policies behind the Labor Statute is irrelevant to the
FOIA analysis."" S
Applying Reporters Committee's standard for Exemption 6
analysis, the Court found the public interest that would be fur-
thered by the release of personnel data to the labor unions to be
"negligible, at best."' 6 According to the Court, "[d]isclosure of
the addresses might allow the unions to communicate more effec-
tively with employees, but it would not appreciably further 'the
citizens' right to be informed about what their government is up
to.' " The Court held that, on the other hand, the privacy in-
terest of employees in the nondisclosure of personnel information
is "not insubstantial," stating that "it is clear that [employees] have
some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure, and in avoiding
the influx of union-related mail, and, perhaps, union-related tele-
phone calls or visits, that would follow disclosure. 118 Because
this privacy interest outweighs a practically nonexistent public
interest in disclosure, the Court agreed with the majority circuits
that FOIA does not mandate the release of personnel information
to federal sector unions and that the Privacy Act therefore prohib-
its such disclosure through the FLRS."9
112. Id. at 1012 (quoting Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 775 (1989)) (alteration in original).
113. Id. at 1014.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771 (holding that "whether an inva-
sion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for which the request for infor-
mation is made").
116. Department of Defense, 114 S. Ct. at 1014.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1015.
119. See id. at 1013-17.
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Although the Supreme Court's holding was dictated by Re-
porters Committee,20 the consequent nondisclosure of employee
data to federal sector labor organizations does not properly bal-
ance the interests of the labor organizations and the agencies.12
The denial of the unions' access to personnel information does not
satisfy the labor organizations' strong interest in disclosure. In the
FLRS, Congress emphasized that collective bargaining serves the
public interest."z Moreover, because the courts have found that
releasing employees' names and addresses to the unions furthers
the process of collective bargaining, such disclosure must be seen
as furthering the public interest."23
Not only are the interests served by disclosure very strong,
but the burden on the agencies in providing this information seems
to be light. Many of the costs incurred by agencies in processing
disclosure requests stem from the need to evaluate whether the
requested material is exempt from disclosure. 24 Once disclosure
of employees' names and addresses is held permissible under the
FLRS, however, the agencies would not have to evaluate any
information or records to determine whether future requests will
fall within the exemptions of FOIA. Instead, agencies would need
only to provide unions with a list of employees' names and ad-
dresses. This small burden on the agencies, in light of the signifi-
cant public interest in disclosure, demonstrates that the respective
interests would be more properly balanced if release of personnel
data were permitted.
120. Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he Court convincingly dem-
onstrates that Reporters Committee, unmodified, requires this result"); see also FLRA v.
Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.. concur-
ring) (asserting that the majority circuits' approach is logically "irreproachable"), cert de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990).
121. Although the disclosure requests in these cases technically originate under the
FLRS rather than under FOIA, they have the same practical effect as FOIA requests.
Therefore, jurisprudence involving FLRS disclosure requests should be analyzed to see
whether it adequately recognizes the public's right to disclosure (represented, here, by the
unions) along with the agencies' interests.
122. See supra text accompanying note 60.
123. In fact, as Justice Ginsburg recognized in her concurrence and the majority noted
in its opinion, the nondisclosure of personnel data to federal sector labor organizations
creates a disparity between public and private sector unions. Department of Defense, 114
S. Ct. at 1019 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). This unequal treatment arises because private
sector unions routinely have access to employee lists under the NLRA. Id. (citing NLRB
v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. NLRB, 412
F.2d 77 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969)).
124. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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Although this analysis of union and agency interests weighs in
favor of the disclosure of employee information, the Court's deci-
sion in Department of Defense prohibits the release of such infor-
mation. Even Justice Ginsburg, who expressed her discontent with
Reporters Committee"z and the resulting disparity between public
and private sector unions, felt obliged to concur in the judgment
because of the weight of judicial authority.'26 Justice Ginsburg
acknowledged that Congress likely did not intend for the statutes
to interact so as to prohibit the disclosure of employee data to
public sector unions.'27 However, neither she nor the majority
was willing to alter the FOIA precedent of Reporters Committee;
they instead offered that "Congress may correct the disparity.""
In fact, Justice Ginsburg had previously stated that Congress often
needs to amend statutes that have created ambiguities and other
problems: "Judges ... regularly call in alarms to the legislature
for the law revisions needed to curb or cohesively resolve litiga-
tion .... The problem has been that, too often, no one in Con-
gress hears the plea.' 29 Congress needs to respond to the plea
in Department of Defense and amend either the FLRS, the Privacy
Act, or FOIA to allow public sector labor unions access to person-
nel information.
III. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE V. LANDANO: THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE DISCLOSURE OF
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES AND INFORMATION UNDER FOIA
Under Exemption 7(D) of FOIA, an agency does not have to
disclose
records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such law enforce-
125. Justice Ginsburg stated, "The Reporters Committee 'core purpose' limitation is not
found in FOIA's language .... Just as the FOIA requestor confronts no 'core purpose'
obstacle at the outset, no such limitation appears in the text of any FOIA exemption."
Department of Defense, 114 S. Ct. at 1018-19 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
126. Justice Ginsburg explained that "I am mindful ... that the preservation of Re-
porters Committee, unmodified, is the position solidly approved by my colleagues, and I
am also mindful that the pull of precedent is strongest in statutory cases." Id. at 1019
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1016.
129. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 1417, 1420, 1429 (1987).
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ment records or information ... could reasonably be expected to
disclose the identity of a confidential source .... and, in the case
of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation .... informa-
tion furnished by a confidential source.3°
According to the Conference Report on the 1974 amendments to
FOIA, a source is confidential if the source "provided information
under an express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances
from which such an assurance could be reasonably inferred.' 3 .
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) rarely can demonstrate
that its sources received an express assurance of confidentiality.
Thus, the issue arose as to how the FBI may show that a source
was operating under an implied assurance of confidentiality and
thereby exempt information involving confidential sources from
disclosure under Exemption 7(D) of FOIA. Until the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision in United States Department of Justice v.
Landano,3 2 the circuit courts were split over how the FBI may
prove such an assurance.
A. Background
In Lame v. Department of Justice,133 the Third Circuit adopt-
ed a lone minority position regarding how the FBI could show
that a source operated under an implied assurance of confidenti-
ality. The court declared that "[w]hether there is an expressed or
implied assurance of confidentiality is a question of fact to be
determined in regard to each source."" To establish this fact,
the FBI must provide a court "with detailed explanations relating
to each alleged confidential source.', 35 The court rejected the
contention that the FBI's evidentiary burden could be met by the
agency's bare assertion that "information was furnished by a confi-
dential source and it is exempt.' 3 6 Instead, the court insisted
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (emphasis added).
131. S. CONF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 1st. Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6291.
132. 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993).
133. 654 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1981).
134. Id. at 923 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 928.
136. Id. at 924 n.7 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 36,871 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart)).
The court in Lame also stated that, as of that time, no other court granted the FBI a
presumption of sources' confidentiality. Id.
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that only detailed explanations could show whether a person had
provided information under an implied assurance of confidentiali-
ty.
137
All the other circuits that considered the issue, on the other
hand, held that "promises of confidentiality are inherently implicit
in FBI interviews conducted pursuant to a criminal investiga-
tion., 138 These circuits noted two policy rationales supporting
such a presumption of confidentiality. First, it ensured that sources
themselves would be protected. 139 Without a blanket presump-
tion, there would always be the chance that some individual's
confidentiality might be breached with the possible result of harm
to the informant. Second, the presumption of confidentiality was
necessary "to insure the continuing efficacy of FBI criminal in-
vestigation."" According to the Eleventh Circuit,
[A] rule requiring the FBI to produce evidence regarding each
individual source's particular expectations as to confidentiality
would cause potential sources to fear that the information they
relay to the FBI will become public knowledge along with their
identity and the fact that they freely disclosed the information to
the FBI. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that an increased fear of
exposure would chill the public's willingness to cooperate with
the FBI in the course of criminal investigations.141
Thus, according to the majority circuits, a presumption of confi-
dentiality was essential, not only to protect FBI sources, but also
to allow the FBI to continue to receive information and carry out
its investigative functions effectively.
B. The Supreme Court's Holding in Landano
In Landano, the Court opted for neither the approach advo-
cated by the majority circuits nor the Third Circuit approach. In-
stead, the Court established an intermediate approach that allows
137. Id. at 928-29.
138. Miller v, Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 960 (1982); see also Nadler v. Department of Justice, 955 F.2d 1479, 1486 (11th Cir.
1992); Schmerler v. FBI, 900 F.2d 333, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Keys v. Department of Jus-
tice, 830 F.2d 337, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Donovan v. FBI, 806 F.2d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 1986);
Johnson v. Department of Justice, 739 F.2d 1514, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1984); Ingle v. De-
partment of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 269 (6th Cir. 1983).
139. See, e.g., Miller, 661 F.2d at 627-28.
140. Id. at 627.
141. Nadler, 955 F.2d at 1486.
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the FBI to demonstrate confidentiality in certain situations while
denying the Bureau a categorical presumption of confidentiality for
all sources.
The Court rejected as unsound an implicit presumption of
confidentiality in all situations. The Court recognized that, al-
though many sources likely provide information under an expecta-
tion of confidentiality, the FBI had not shown that all its sources
have such expectations. 42 The Court noted the wide variety of
sources that provide information to the FBI, from "the paid infor-
mant who infiltrates an underworld organization" and "the eyewit-
ness to a violent crime" to "the telephone company that releases
phone records" and "the state agency that furnishes an ad-
dress.' 43 Although confidentiality would be very important to
those such as the paid informants and key witnesses, it would be
unrealistic to assume that all FBI informants, such as the
telephone company, believe they are 'speaking to the FBI confiden-
tially.'" In light of this wide diversity of sources, the Court as-
serted that a blanket presumption of confidentiality for all FBI
sources would be unreasonable. 45
The Court also stated that a blanket presumption for the FBI
would be unfair to FOIA requestors seeking to ascertain the
source of the FBI's information. The Court noted that in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson,146 a securities case, it had upheld the use of
presumptions that comport with "fairness, public policy, and proba-
bility, as well as judicial economy."'47 The Landano Court assert-
ed that a blanket presumption in favor of the FBI would not
promote fairness, because it would almost always result in the
denial of FOIA requests. 48 Even the government recognized that
the presumption it was seeking would become essentially irrebutta-
ble in practice.149 Under such a presumption, once the FBI stated
that information had been provided by a confidential source, the
person seeking disclosure probably would not have access to any
142. Department of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2020 (1993).
143. Id. at 2021.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2022.
146. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
147. Id. at 245.
148. Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2022.
149. Id.
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evidence concerning whether the FBI source actually had operated
under an assurance of confidentiality.
Additionally, the Court noted that Reporters Committee does
not support a blanket presumption of confidentiality for the FBI
under Exemption 7(D). In Reporters Committee, the Court held
that FBI rap sheets are exempt from disclosure because they cate-
gorically constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy under Ex-
emption 7(C).15 The Court allowed this presumption because the
privacy interests in the nondisclosure of rap sheets invariably out-
weigh the public interest in their disclosure. In Landano, the Court
acknowledged that "when certain circumstances characteristically
support an inference of confidentiality, the Government similarly
should be able to claim an exemption under Exemption 7(D)
without detailing the circumstances surrounding a particular inter-
view.""' However, Exemption 7(D) does not lend itself to a sim-
ilar categorical presumption because of the variety of FBI sources.
The Landano Court also considered the legislative history of
Exemption 7(D). In its argument for a presumption of confidenti-
ality for the FBI, the government offered evidence that legislators
had been concerned about the importance of confidentiality to the
FBI. 52 The Court, however, responded that Congress's recogni-
tion of the FBI's interest in confidentiality did not mean that
"Congress intended for the Bureau to be able to satisfy its burden
in every instance simply by asserting that a source communicated
with the Bureau during the course of a criminal investigation.
1 53
If Congress had intended this, then, according to the Court, "it
could have done so much more clearly."5
Despite its rejection of a blanket presumption of confidentiali-
ty, the Court refrained from adopting Lame's requirement that the
FBI provide detailed explanations each time it alleged the confi-
dentiality of a source.'55 Instead, Landano established that the
FBI must "point to more narrowly defined circumstances that will
support the inference" that a source is confidential and provided
guidelines for how the FBI should demonstrate these circumstanc-
150. Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 780 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
151. Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2022.
152. See id. (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 17,037 (1974) (statement of Sen. Thurmond)).
153. Id. at 2023.
154. Id.
155. See Lame v. Department of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 928 (3d Cir. 1981).
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es.156 In particular, the Court pointed to two factors-"the char-
acter of the crime at issue" and "the source's relation to the
crime"-that "may be relevant to determining whether a source
cooperated with the FBI with an implied assurance of confidential-
ity."157 For example, the Court stated that, on consideration of
these two factors, a reviewing court should infer that a witness to
a gang-related murder would have provided the FBI with informa-
tion only if there had been some assurance of confidentiality.5 '
Furthermore, the Court remarked that there are "generic
circumstances in which an implied assurance of confidentiality"
should be inferred."9 The Court provided the example of a paid
informant whose ongoing relationship with the Bureau would make
it reasonable for a court to infer an assurance of confidentiali-
ty.6 The illustrations given in Landano are not the only factors
and generic circumstances available to the FBI for demonstrating
an inference of confidentiality; the Bureau may try to use other
means as well.16 By providing these methods for the FBI to
demonstrate an assurance of confidentiality, Landano does not go
as far as to allow the Bureau a blanket presumption of confidenti-
ality, but it does provide adequate means for the FBI to prove
that nondisclosure is warranted under Exemption 7(D) of FOIA
due to a source's expectation of confidentiality.
In Landano, the Court properly addressed both the public's
right to disclosure and the FBI's interests as it determined the
Bureau's evidentiary burden under Exemption 7(D). The Court es-
tablished an intermediate approach, rather than either allowing the
government a complete presumption of confidentiality or forcing
the FBI to provide detailed explanations establishing confidentiali-
ty for each source. This position adequately protects the right of
the public to disclosure of FBI materials. By requiring the FBI to
"point to more narrowly defined circumstances"'6 rather than
156. Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2023.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The Court stated that "[tihere may well be other generic circumstances in which
an implied assurance of confidentiality fairly can be inferred." Id. In addition, when the
Court listed the two factors that can be used to support such an inference, it used the
introductory phrase "for example" to indicate that these are only suggestions and not ex-
clusive factors for establishing confidentiality. Id. at 2024.
162. Id. at 2023.
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merely asserting that a source is confidential, the Court allowed
the FOIA requestor an opportunity to argue that particular cir-
cumstances do not warrant an inference of confidentiality. If the
Court instead had allowed a presumption of confidentiality for all
the FBI's sources, FOIA requestors would have difficulty rebutting
the presumption. 6 3
The Landano Court also recognized the interests of the FBI.
The Court realized that the approach established by the Third
Circuit in Lame, requiring detailed explanations from the FBI for
every source, would greatly burden the Bureau. Even the Third
Circuit had previously acknowledged the possibility that its holding
would "unduly tax limited FBI resources."'" Thus, the Court's
decision in Landano places as minimal a burden as possible on the
FBI while ensuring that the public's right to disclosure under
FOIA is protected.
IV. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S 1993 FOIA GUIDELINES
FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS
On October 4, 1993, President William Clinton and Attorney
General Janet Reno issued memoranda to the heads of federal
departments and agencies on how to satisfy the rules and spirit of
FOIA. These memoranda established new guidelines that rescinded
the Reagan administration rules of 1981 and demonstrated the
Clinton administration's desire to instill in federal agencies a more
receptive attitude toward FOIA requests.
In his executive memorandum, President Clinton described the
new open approach that he wants agencies to adopt toward FOIA
requests. Clinton declared that he is "committed to enhancing
[FOIA's] effectiveness in [his] Administration" and stressed that
FOIA plays a "unique role in strengthening our democratic form
of government."'" To meet these goals, Clinton
call[ed] upon all Federal departments and agencies to renew their
commitment to the Freedom of Information Act, to its under-
lying principles of government openness, and to its sound admin-
163. See id. at 2022 (noting that "very rarely will [the requestor] be in a position to
offer persuasive evidence that the source in fact had no interest in confidentiality").
164. Landano v. Department of Justice, 956 F.2d 422, 435 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated, 113
S. Ct. 2014 (1993).
165. Memorandum from President William J. Clinton for Heads of Departments and
Agencies 1 (Oct. 4, 1993) (on file with author).
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istration. This is an appropriate time for all agencies to take a
fresh look at their administration of the Act, to reduce backlogs
of Freedom of Information Act requests, and to conform agency
practice to the new litigation guidance issued by the Attorney
General . . .66
By following this new approach, agencies, according to Clinton,
will abide by the spirit of FOIA and further the democratic pur-
poses Congress intended FOIA to serve.
Attorney General Reno's memorandum reinforced and applied
the President's message. 67 Following Clinton's order that agen-
cies be more open to FOIA requests, Reno rescinded the Depart-
ment of Justice's 1981 FOIA guidelines that had been issued by
the Reagan administration."6 Under the Reagan guidelines, the
Department of Justice defended federal agencies in FOIA suits if
there was a "substantial legal basis" for denying the FOIA re-
quest.'69 This standard allowed agencies to scrutinize FOIA re-
quests carefully, rejecting borderline ones that technically fell
within a FOIA exemption, and still receive the support of the Jus-
tice Department in court. Reno's guidelines reversed this policy
and provided that the Department of Justice will "defend the
assertion of a FOIA exemption only in those cases where the
agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful to an
,,170 hsne tninterest protected by that exemption. Under this new Stan
dard, agencies should not withhold information merely because the
data "might technically or arguably fall within an exemption. 1 71
The Department of Justice now will "apply a presumption of dis-
closure" when deciding whether to defend an agency in a FOIA
suit.
172
Reno's memorandum also requested that the U.S. Attorneys
and the Assistant Attorneys General for the Department's Civil
and Tax Divisions review the merits of all pending FOIA litigation
in light of the new guidelines. In addition, Reno instructed the
166. Id.
167. See Reno Memo, supra note 19.
168. See Letter of Attorney General William French Smith to All Federal Depart-
ments and Agencies (May 5, 1981), cited in Christopher M. Mason, Note, Developments
Under the Freedom of Information Act-1981, 1982 DUKE L.J. 423. 425 n.17.
169. Id.
170. Reno Memo, supra note 19, at 1.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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Department of Justice to review and revise all regulations relating
to FOIA and to examine all current FOIA forms for their accura-
cy and clarity. In an attempt to address the large backlogs at the
federal agencies in processing FOIA requests, Reno also requested
that each agency send to the Department of Justice its annual
FOIA report for 1992 to Congress, along with a description of the
agency's current FOIA backlog and staffing difficulties. Reno con-
cluded that these efforts should improve the effectiveness of FOIA
and make "the executive branch more open, more responsive, and
more accountable." 173
Although the memoranda from President Clinton and Attor-
ney General Reno clearly recognized the importance of the
public's interest in disclosure under FOIA, they failed to protect
agency interests adequately. Reno's memorandum did acknowledge
the burden on agencies in processing FOIA requests, which is
currently manifested by the large backlogs at many federal agen-
cies. In her memorandum, she stated that the Department of Jus-
tice would review the backlogs at each federal agency and work
with the agencies and Congress to alleviate the agencies' prob-
lems. 74 However, by requiring greater compliance from agencies
without first resolving the agencies' difficulties in processing re-
quests, the executive guidelines are likely to aggravate the burden
on the agencies and increase the resulting FOIA backlogs. The
new standards likely will increase the number of FOIA requests
because of the mandate that agencies apply a "presumption of
disclosure."'75 At the same time, the new memoranda do not
provide for more resources or other means for the agencies to
accommodate the demand, making it all the more difficult for
agencies to consider and fulfill each FOIA request promptly. A
more sensible approach would have been first to study the current
problems of the agencies in handling FOIA requests and then,
only after having established a plan to ease the agencies' burdens,
to alter the guidelines for agencies under FOIA. By focusing in-
stead on the public's interest in disclosure and inadequately ad-
dressing the interests of the federal agencies, the Clinton
administration's 1993 FOIA guidelines will only further hamper the
public's access to government information.
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1.
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V. CONCLUSION
In 1993 and early 1994, high costs and backlogs continued to
hamper the administration of FOIA. Recent developments under
FOIA, however, demonstrated only mixed success in addressing
both the public's right to disclosure and agency interests. On the
one hand, the Supreme Court's decision in Landano illustrated a
proper effort to provide for adequate disclosure while minimizing
the burden on the FBI. Moreover, the approach indicated by the
Supreme Court in Kay and followed by the D.C. Circuit in Bena-
vides concerning the right of pro se litigants to attorney's fees also
resulted in an adequate balancing of interests under FOIA. On the
other hand, the denial of access by federal sector unions to lists of
employees' names and addresses as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Department of Defense v. FLRA likely will
have to be remedied by Congress to reach a result that accommo-
dates the interests of both the public and the agencies. Finally, the
executive memoranda issued in October 1993 by the Clinton ad-
ministration failed to address realistically the large burden that
FOIA requests have placed on federal agencies. Unless these con-
cerns are recognized by the courts and the executive branch, the
current unanticipated problems of FOIA will continue, frustrating
Congress's purpose of establishing the right to access government
information.
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